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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of forum-selection clauses in contracts continues to
increase. Emboldened by the Supreme Court's endorsement of forum-
selection clauses,1 large companies now frequently use these clauses
in a variety of contracts. Contracting parties use these clauses in part
to ensure that the parties can resolve any dispute in a convenient
forum. Often, however, a party inserts a forum-selection clause to
limit liability by increasing the barriers to litigation or arbitration.2
Typically, the party inserting the forum-selection clause has superior
bargaining power and inserts into the contract a clause designating a
forum remote to the other party, where any dispute over the contract
will be heard. In this scenario, the other party to the contract, if
seeking redress for a breach of the contract, must travel to a distant
and unfamiliar jurisdiction to have the claim heard, often before the
opposing party's "home court." When the party seeking redress is
unsophisticated and has no wealth of resources, the costs associated
with bringing a suit can be prohibitive.3 Thus, the party inserting the
forum-selection clause is less likely to be sued or held liable for a
breach.
In recent years, businesses have begun using a special kind of
forum-selection clause: an arbitration clause which provides that any
dispute will be resolved in binding arbitration.4 Sometimes parties
use these clauses to ensure that an expert will decide the dispute or to
avoid the cost and inconvenience of litigation. Again, however, parties
often use arbitration clauses to force a weaker party to seek redress in
a remote, unfamiliar forum.
Forum-selection clauses and arbitration clauses are common in
franchise contracts. 5 In the typical franchise contract, the franchisor
1. See infra Part IIIA for a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of forum-
selection clauses under federal law.
2. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-
Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 445-449 (1992) (discussing in
detail the hardships imposed on would-be plaintiffs by forum-selection clauses).
3. See id.
4. Arbitration agreements are generally regarded as a kind of forum-selection clause
because they indicate the forum in which the dispute is to be heard. See Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (characterizing an arbitration agreement as "a specialized
kind of forum-selection clause").
5. See Benjamin A. Levin & Richard S. Morrison, Kubis and the Changing Landscape of
Forum Selection Clauses, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 97, 115-16 (1997) (summarizing Supreme Court
treatment of the Federal Arbitration Act and predicting the future controversy of "the enforce-
ability of arbitration provisions requiring.., a designated site"). A franchise agreement is
generally defined as "an agreement between a supplier of a product or service or an owner of a
desired trademark or copyright (franchisor), and a reseller (franchisee) under which the franchi-
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is a large, national corporation, represented by sophisticated legal
counsel. The franchisee is an individual, often unsophisticated, and
almost always unrepresented by legal counsel at the time of
contracting. The contract is presented to the franchisee on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. If the franchisee objects to the terms the franchisor
can usually find another willing franchisee. The contract is several
pages long, with the arbitration/forum-selection clause hidden
beneath boilerplate legalese. 6 These circumstances provide a great
incentive for franchisors to use the forum-selection clause as a
weapon to limit the franchisee's legal recourse. The franchisees, often
unsophisticated and not represented by legal counsel, are likely not to
read the clause or to understand fully its implications. Even if the
franchisee does recognize the clause's significance, little or no
opportunity to change it will exist.7
In response to this type of overreaching by franchisors, several
states have adopted laws that require arbitration or litigation over a
franchise contract to occur in the franchisee's home state and which
void contractual provisions that provide otherwise.8 These laws are
often enacted as part of a state's franchise laws, which generally are
designed to protect franchisees from unfair contracts and unfair
treatment by franchisors who have superior bargaining power.9 The
statutes restricting forum-selection clauses are specifically aimed at
protecting the franchisee from having to pursue redress of a breach of
contract in a remote forum.'0 Many states have recently passed these
laws (or have promulgated them in state courts), and commentators
predict that this trend will continue."
Arguably, however, these state laws cannot invalidate arbitra-
tion agreements because of the preemptive power of the Federal
see agrees to sell the franchisor's product or service or to do business under the franchsior's
name." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (6th ed. 1990). A common example of a franchise is the
ownership of a single fast-food restaurant.
6. See Donald B. Brenner, There is a Developing Trend Among Courts of Making Choice
of Forum Clauses in Franchise Agreements Presumptively Invalid, 102 COM. L.J. 94, 94-95
(1997) (discussing the imbalance of power in franchise agreements).
7. The American Franchisee Association identifies arbitration agreements calling for
arbitration in the franchisor's home state as among the most oppressive franchise agreement
provisions. See Franchise Agreement Arbitration Clauses Are Here to Stay... Or Are They?, 7
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 172, 173 (1996).
8. See infra Part IH.B for a detailed discussion of these statutes and rules.
9. See infra Part IH.B for a discussion of the legislative and judicial purposes behind
these laws.
10. See id.
11. See Brenner, supra note 6, at 108-13; Levin & Morrison, supra note 5, at 97.
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Arbitration Act ("FAA7).1- The Supreme Court has interpreted the
FAA as establishing a national policy in favor of arbitration.13 Any
state law which undermines this policy, or which singles out
arbitration agreements for suspect treatment, is in danger of FAA
preemption. The FAA does not preempt state laws that apply general
contract law to invalidate arbitration agreements. 4 In light of recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, the breadth of this exception is
uncertain. 5
Considering several factors, including the increasing use of
arbitration clauses selecting out-of-state forums in franchise
contracts, the trend among states to hold this type of forum-selection
clause invalid in franchise contracts, and the broad scope of
preemptive power that the Supreme Court has given the FAA, the
question of a state law's ability to invalidate a foreign state
arbitration agreement stands to be an important, and hotly contested
issue in the near future.16 This Note argues that the FAA should not
preempt state franchise laws which limit the use of forum-selection
clauses in franchise contracts. First, Part II surveys the history of the
FAA and its preemptive power over state law. Part III analyzes the
law governing the validity of forum-selection clauses, including both
the general law of forum-selection clauses and the specific limits some
states place on them in franchise contract settings. Finally, Part IV
examines the interplay between these two doctrines. This section
argues that state laws which void forum-selection agreements do not
hold arbitration clauses to a higher standard than other contracts and
do not undermine the policy of the FAA. Instead, these state laws
address the inherent unfairness in requiring individuals to seek
redress in remote forums. 7 This focus is a legitimate application of
state law that is outside the scope of the FAA.18
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
13. See infra Part II (discussing the FAA's preemptive power).
14. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See Levin & Morrison, supra note 5, at 115-16.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See infra Part IV.
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II. PREEMPTIVE POWER OF THE FAA
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the FAA has broad pre-
emptive power over state laws that conflict with its text or policies. 19
Limits to the statute's preemptive powers exist, but have yet to be
defined clearly. The Supreme Court has a long history of interpreting
the FAA. Lower courts have applied the principles laid out by the
Supreme Court to a variety of arbitration agreements. A handful of
cases directly addresses whether the FAA preempts state laws
limiting forum-selection.
A. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the FAA
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to overrule the existing
common law that often invalidated arbitration agreements. 20 Section
2 of the FAA proclaims that in all contracts "involving commerce," an
arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."21 In spite of its sweeping language, the FAA initially
had little effect on the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 22 For
years, many believed the FAA applied only in federal court.23 As a
result, state courts continued to apply anti-arbitration case law to
invalidate arbitration agreements.2 In 1967, the Supreme Court first
held that the FAA was federal substantive law that Congress enacted
under its Commerce Clause powers, and thus the Act applied to all
cases involving interstate commerce. 25  Even after this case, it
remained unclear how the FAA would interact with state laws
governing arbitration. 26
19. See infra Part Il.A for a discussion of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the
FAA's preemptive power.
20. Prior to the FAA, courts usually considered arbitration agreements either void or
voidable at the will of any party. The primary rationale for this rule was the puzzling claim
that arbitration ousted the jurisdiction of courts, violating public policy. See Thomas A.
Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect upon the Federal Arbitration Act:
Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 35-37 (1997).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).
22. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 122-33 (1992) (discussing the relative dearth of cases brought in early
years after passage of the FAA).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 122-27 (stating that early commentators believed that provisions of the Act
governed only federal courts).
25. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,405 (1967).
26. In Prima Paint, no state law was at issue. See id.
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In recent years, however, the FAA's preemptive power over
state laws has been greatly expanded by a number of Supreme Court
opinions. This new era for arbitration began in 1983 with Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.2 7 In Moses H.
Cone the Court held that the FAA had established a federal policy in
favor of arbitration, and thus, in cases involving questions of
arbitrability, all ambiguities regarding the scope and validity of an
arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration.28 The
Court also strongly suggested that the FAA would apply equally in
state and federal courts.29
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court explicitly held that
the FAA applied in both federal and state courts.30 The Court also
concluded that, under the Supremacy Clause,31 the FAA preempted
state statutes that invalidated arbitration agreements.3 2 The Court
did note that arbitration agreements must be part of a written
contract "involving commerce" in order to fall under the FAA, and
even when controlled by the FAA could still be "revoked upon
'grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.' "33 In the absence of either of these exceptions, however, the
FAA applied and upheld arbitration agreements regardless of state
law.3
The Court briefly halted its expansion of the FAA's reach in
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees.35 In Volt, the
Court held that the FAA did not preempt a state law that allowed a
court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation.386 The
Court noted that the FAA does not "reflect a congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of arbitration."37 The key question, according
27. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
28. See id. at 24-25.
29. See id. at 26-27.
30. See 465 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1984).
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause reads "[tihis Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
state shall be bound thereby."
32. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16. In Southland, the statute held to be preempted
was a California franchise law which voided any contractual provision that requires the
franchisee to waive compliance with any state franchise law. The California Supreme Court
construed this statute to require judicial consideration of claims brought under the state
franchise laws. See id. at 5.
33. Id. at 10-11 (quoting section 2 of the FAA).
34. See id. at 11.
35. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
36. See id. at 478.
37. Id. at 477-78. The law conflicted with the FAA because the FAA does not authorize a
stay of arbitration.
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to the Court, was whether the state law at issue would undermine the
FAA's goals and policies; here, it did not.38
Following Volt, however, the Supreme Court has expanded the
reach of the FAA in two ways: (1) application of the FAA to nearly all
contracts, and (2) preemption of almost every conflicting state law
that deals specifically with arbitration. In Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, the Court held that the requirement that the
contract "involve commerce" in order to fall under the FAA meant
merely that the FAA extended to the limits of Congress's legislative
power under the Commerce Clause.39 Given the broad reach of the
Commerce Clause, this means that the FAA applies to virtually every
contract that includes an arbitration agreement.40 Thus, the Court
essentially eliminated one limitation that the Southland Court placed
on the FAA.
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning FAA
preemption, Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, also recognized the
FAA's broad preemptive power.41 In Casarotto, the Court invalidated
a Montana statute that required an arbitration clause be printed on
the first page of the contract, in underlined capital letters.42 The
Court reaffirmed Southland, noting that "generally applicable
contract defenses," such as fraud or unconscionability, may still
invalidate arbitration agreements, but that courts and state
legislatures may not single out arbitration agreements and hold them
to a higher level of scrutiny.43
Thus, in the law's present state, the FAA has broad pre-
emptive power. The statute applies to nearly all contracts under
Allied-Bruce. It also preempts every state law that singles out arbi-
tration agreements for "suspect status." Finally, the Court has held
that the FAA embodies a federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
38. See id. The Court found that the state law did not undermine the goals and policies of
the FAA because the state statute merely provided another procedure for enforcing an arbitra-
tion agreement, and because the parties to the agreement agreed that state arbitration law
would cover their agreement. See id. at 479. For a discussion of the parties' choice of law on
FAA preemption, see generally Diamond, supra note 20; Michael A. Hanzman, Arbitration
Agreements: Analyzing Threshold Choice of Law and Arbitrability Questions: An Often
Overlooked Task, 70 FLA. B.J. 14 (1996).
39. 513 U.S. 265,273-74(1995).
40. For example, the contract in Allied-Bruce, to which the FAA was ruled applicable, was
a "Termite Protection Plan" between a homeowner and a local termite exterminator in Alabama.
Id. at 837.
41. 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
42. See id. at 689.
43. See id. at 688.
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ments where "all doubts are resolved in favor of arbitration."44
Notwithstanding the Court's comments in Volt, the FAA apparently
has preempted the field of arbitration law.45
The Supreme Court has yet to decide, however, whether the
FAA preempts state laws that, as applied, invalidate arbitration
agreements but are also applicable to contract clauses other than
arbitration clauses. A notable example of this type of law is a law
that restricts the validity of a forum-selection clause. Lower courts
have touched on this issue, but are far from resolving it.
B. Lower Courts' Treatment of FAA Preemption
Lower courts have distinguished between laws that violate the
FAA and are preempted, and laws that are merely "general contract
law" and thus outside the preemptive scope of the FAA.46 These
decisions reinforce the principle that laws which "single out"
arbitration agreements must give way to the FAA. 47 These cases,
however, also provide strong support for the proposition that courts
can use contract law principles to reject an arbitration agreement as
unconscionable without violating the FAA.48 Finally, lower courts
have not resolved whether state laws that apply to other types of
contracts in addition to arbitration agreements, but not to contracts in
general, are preempted by the FAA.49 One example of such state laws
is a law restricting forum-selection clauses.
Lower courts have consistently followed Supreme Court prece-
dent in striking down state laws that single out arbitration agree-
ments. If a state statute, court decision, or regulation explicitly pro-
hibits or finds unconscionable all arbitration agreements, courts after
Southland have been unanimous in holding that the FAA preempts
44. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
45. The present state of arbitration under the FAA has been criticized by many commen-
tators. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. Rlv. 1945 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996). But see
Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate: Judicial and
Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agreements, 1993 ANN. SURv. AM. L.
925, 926 (in favor of present law). The wisdom of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
FAA is outside the scope of this Note.
46. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
49. See infra Part II.C.
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state law.O Lower courts have also followed the Supreme Court's
language from Moses H. Cone and resolved all doubts about a contrac-
tual provision in favor of arbitration.51
Several courts have also held or noted in dicta that the FAA
preempts provisions of state franchise laws which restrict the use of
arbitration agreements. 52 In all of these cases, however, with the
exception of those that deal with statutes that restrict forum-selection
clauses, 53 the statute in question "singled out" arbitration agreements
for suspect treatment or outright prohibition, without any parallel
restrictions on forum-selection clauses. Thus, these cases offer little
insight regarding preemption of statutes restricting forum-selection
clauses.
In contrast, lower courts also have consistently held that
fraud, duress, unconscionability, or other contract defenses may in-
validate arbitration agreements without violating the FAA.M Those
cases holding arbitration agreements unconscionable and thus unen-
forceable are particularly instructive. As noted above, the FAA will
preempt a state statute or judicial decision which finds all arbitration
agreements unconscionable. 55 Many courts, however, have struck
down arbitration agreements as unconscionable, despite the FAA, if
50. See, e.g., David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 250-51 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that the FAA preempted a state statute requiring 10-point capital letters
providing notice for an arbitration clause); Bayma v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 784
F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding preempted a state law that held all arbitration agree-
ments in employment contracts invalid as contracts of adhesion).
51. The Court in Moses H. Cone noted that because the FAA established national policy
favoring arbitration, "any doubts... should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Lower courts have cited this
language numerous times. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 981 (2d Cir. 1996)
("[A]ny doubts concerning whether there has been a waiver are resolved in favor of arbitration.")
(citation omitted).
52. See, e.g., Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 724-27 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the FAA overrides a state franchise statute which prohibited automobile manufac-
turers and dealers from assenting to mandatory arbitration agreements); Seymour v. Gloria
Jean's Coffee Bean Franchising Corp., 732 F. Supp. 988, 994 (D. Minn. 1990) (stating that the
FAA preempts a state franchise law prohibiting predispute arbitration agreements in franchise
agreements); Davis v. Rentrak Corp., No. 88-69614, 1989 WL 2047, at *5-*7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6,
1989) (noting that the FAA preempted the state franchise law even if the state law was con-
strued to void arbitration agreements). See also the discussion of the Supreme Court's holding
in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
53. See infra Part H.C (discussing cases addressing statutes that restrict forum-selection).
54. This rule comes from the text of the FAA which upholds arbitration agreements "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1994).
55. See, e.g., Bayma, 784 F.2d at 1023 (holding preempted state law that invalidates all
arbitration agreements in employment contracts).
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the terms of the agreement are one-sided and the inequality of
bargaining power is great.56
Courts have found arbitration agreements unconscionable for a
variety of reasons. The most common example of unconscionability in
arbitration agreements is where the arbitrator chosen holds a bias in
favor of a particular party.57 Three other factors that some courts
have found to be evidence of unconscionability include (1) one party
burdened with an unfair share of the costs of arbitration; (2) lack of
mutuality; 8 and (3) unreasonable restrictions on the arbitrator's
ability to provide a remedy.59
Some courts have also found arbitration agreements to be sub-
stantively unconscionable because the agreement subjected one party
to a remote forum. In Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., the
California Court of Appeals held an arbitration agreement uncon-
scionable, in part, because it required California residents to arbitrate
any disputes in Minnesota.60 The California Court of Appeals has
used similar reasoning to scrutinize and strike down arbitration
agreements calling for remote forums. 61
In contrast, in federal court these claims have been less suc-
cessful. 62 Federal courts seem to require a strong showing of proce-
dural unconscionability, in addition to a substantive showing of an
unconscionable remote forum.63 Nonetheless, these cases demonstrate
56. Unconscionability is generally seen as having two requirements: (1) procedural
unconscionability, which means a gross inequality in bargaining power; and (2) substantive
unconscionability, which means unfairness in the substantive terms of the contract. See ALLAN
E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990). Part H.B focuses on the terms of arbitration
agreements that courts have found unconscionable, thus addressing only substantive uncon-
scionability.
57. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (finding the arbitrator cho-
sen "presumptively biased" in favor of one party and thus the clause unconscionable). For a
detailed discussion and analysis of these and other cases finding unconscionable arbitration
agreements, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor's Associates,
Inc: v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1018-34 (1996).
58. The conditions for lack of mutuality exist when one party is bound to have its claims
arbitrated in court but the other is free to bring suit. See Ware, supra note 57, at 1024.
59. See id. at 1023-26 (discussing these three factors).
60. See 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
61. See Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 740, 745 (Ct.
App. 1982) (remanding case for determination of whether location of arbitration in Ohio is
unconscionable); Player v. Geo. M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 149, 154-56 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971) (finding an exception to the arbitration clause in the contract but noting in dicta that even
without the exception clause the validity of the agreement would be in doubt and calling on
courts to "scan closely contracts which bear facial resemblance to contracts of adhesion and
which contain cross-country arbitration clauses").
62. See Breckenridge, supra note 45, at 966.
63. See, e.g., China Resource Prods. U.S.A-, Ltd. v. Fayda Int'l, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1101,
1107 (D. Del. 1990) (upholding an arbitration in China due to sophistication of parties);
Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1326-28 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (finding
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that courts will entertain arguments regarding the fairness of
particular arbitration agreements and, despite the FAA, will strike
down arbitration agreements deemed unconscionable.6
C. Applying the FAA to State Laws Restricting Forum-Selection
The most recent case addressing forum-selection laws is
Alphagraphics Franchising v. Whaler Graphics, Inc. 65 In
Alphagraphics, the franchisor and franchisee entered into a franchise
agreement that included a provision for arbitration in Arizona in the
event of a dispute.66 The franchise was to do business in Michigan.67
The franchisor filed suit attempting to compel arbitration, and the
franchisee raised as a defense the Michigan Franchise Investment
Law,68 which invalidated forum-selection and arbitration agreements
that selected out-of-state venues. 69 The court held that the Michigan
law was preempted by the FAA, because the law focused on
arbitration agreements more than other contracts.70 The court went
on to hold, however, that the arbitration agreement was the product
of fraudulent inducement, thus voiding the agreement and casting
doubt on the precedential value of the preemption holding.71
Several older cases from Puerto Rico also have examined the
interplay between state restrictions on forum-selection and the FAA.72
The courts in these cases have concluded that the FAA preempted a
Puerto Rican statute that voided remote forum-selection clauses in
dealership contracts.73 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., an automobile dealer brought a counterclaim against
its manufacturer-supplier, claiming breach of contract and violation of
arbitration in Italy for American company not unconscionable, because the American company
was a sophisticated business with international experience and could not show any unfair lack
of bargaining power).
64. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
65. 840 F. Supp. 708 (D. Ariz. 1993).
66. See id. at 709.
67. See id.
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(f) (West 1997). See infra notes 119-20 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this statute.
69. See id.
70. See Alphagraphics, 840 F. Supp. at 710. The court did not elaborate.
71. See id. at 711.
72. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
73. See Michael v. NAP Consumer Elecs. Corp., 574 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D.P.R. 1983). The
statute declares that "any stipulation that obligates a dealer to adjust, arbitrate or litigate any
controversy that comes up regarding his dealer's contract outside of Puerto Rico... is therefore
null and void." P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 10 § 278b-2 (1997).
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state and federal law.74  The manufacturer sought to compel
arbitration of the dealer's counterclaims, and, in response, the dealer
argued that the state law invalidated the arbitration clause in the
dealer agreement.75 The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
FAA preempted the Puerto Rican law, because the law singled out
arbitration.76 As in Alphagraphics, the Mitsubishi court did not
elaborate on why the state law singled out arbitration.77 The district
court in Puerto Rico has followed Mitsubishi Motors and held that the
law as applied to arbitration is preempted by the FAA.78
Although these cases will doubtless be cited by those who ar-
gue for arbitration under similar circumstances, the cases are of lim-
ited value. First, the precedential value of Alphagraphics is limited
because the discussion of the issue is in dicta.79 More importantly no
court in any of these cases provides an explanation for its conclusion.
The extent of the preemption analysis in each case is the conclusory
statement that the statute "singled out" arbitration. Presumably, the
court concluded that the statute unfairly singled out arbitration
because the statute applied specifically to arbitration. Each statute in
question, however, also applied to all forum-selection clauses. Also
absent from these cases is any analysis of the policies underlying the
state statute in question and the policy behind the FAA.
In sum, current case law does not resolve whether the the FAA
preempts statutes invalidating forum-selection clauses. The few
cases on point suggest that the FAA should preempt state law. These
cases have limited precedential value, however, and do not fully
explore the conflicting policies at issue. The extensive body of case
law on general FAA preemption has produced no analogous cases.
Nearly all of these cases either strike down laws that apply only to
arbitration or uphold the use of general contract law to invalidate
74. See 723 F.2d 155, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1983), affid in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The FAA preemption of the Puerto Rican law was not contested
before the Supreme Court. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 622 n.8.
75. See id. The dealer actually did not argue that the Puerto Rican law applied directly;
rather, it argued that the law was "incorporated" into the dealership agreement. Id. at 158.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Michael, 579 F. Supp. at 69-70 (D.P.R. 1983) (finding the same statute preempted
by the FAA two months before the Mitsubishi Motors case was decided, but apparently
misreading the statute to invalidate all arbitration agreements); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sea-
Land of P.R., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 750, 753 (D.P.R. 1986) (noting in dicta the holding from
Mitsubishi); Protane Gas Co. of P.R., Inc. v. Sony Consumer Prods. Co., 613 F. Supp. 215, 217
(D.P.R. 1985) (following Mitsubishi and upholding an arbitration agreement in spite of the state
law).
79. See Alphagraphics Franchising v. Whaler Graphics, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D.
Ariz. 1993).
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arbitration agreements. 80 To resolve this issue, courts must look
beyond precedent and, instead, focus on the policies underlying the
both the FAA and the state laws restricting forum-selection clauses.
III. FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES AND FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
Recently, the law governing the validity of forum-selection
clauses has changed rapidly. Specifically, the Supreme Court has
held forum-selection clauses presumptively valid under federal law.81
As a result, many states have reversed long-standing common law
holding forum-selection clauses invalid. Many states, however, have
begun to apply new restrictions on forum-selection clauses in
contracts where the imbalance of bargaining power is great. In par-
ticular, several states now have laws that restrict the use of forum-
selection clauses in franchise agreements. 2 The following section
discusses both the current federal law favoring forum-selection
clauses, and the particular state laws that limit the use of the clauses
in franchise agreements.
A. Presumptive Validity of Forum-Selection Clauses Under
Federal Law
The general rule the Supreme Court has promulgated is that
forum-selection clauses are "prima facie valid."8 In order to rebut
this presumption of validity, a party must show that the clause is
unreasonable under the circumstances.84 This presumption was an-
nounced in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., in which the Court
abandoned the historical view of disfavoring forum-selection clausesw
and upheld a forum-selection clause that provided for a dispute be-
tween an American and a German company to be resolved in the
80. See supra Part H.B.
81. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
82. See infra Part HI.B.
83. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
84. See id.
85. See id. Courts before The Bremen often did not enforce forum-selection clauses under
the rationale that, as with arbitration agreements, forum-selection clauses "ousted" the juris-
diction of the court. Id. The Court rejected this policy in The Bremen. Note that the rationale
behind many present-day laws limiting forum-selection clauses are quite different from this
"ousting" rationale, however, as these state laws are concerned with the hardship imposed by
requiring a party to have its claim heard in a remote location. See infra Part 1V.B for a discus-
sion of this distinction.
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London Court of Justice.86 The Court noted that this clause was
negotiated freely by the parties and was not so inconvenient to one
party as to erect an insurmountable barrier to judicial redress.8 7
The Court expanded its "presumptive validity" of forum-selec-
tion clauses to cover adhesion contracts in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute.88 In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court enforced a forum-
selection clause printed on the ticket of a cruise passenger ticket,
which required the plaintiff, a Washington resident, to bring suit in
Florida.89 Relying on the plaintiffs failure to claim lack of notice of
the forum-selection clause and the Court's determination that Florida
was not a "remote alien forum," the Court held that the rule from The
Bremen was controlling and that the clause was enforceable. 90
Thus after Carnival Cruise Lines, regardless of the type of
contract or remoteness of the forum, the federal law presumes that
forum-selection clauses are valid. A party may rebut this
presumption with a showing of serious unfairness in the bargaining
process or in the location of the forum.91 The presumption has far-
reaching effects because the Supreme Court has also held that, in at
least some situations, federal courts must apply the federal law of
forum-selection clauses in diversity and federal question cases.92 For
example, in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., the Court held
that when a party relies on a forum-selection clause in a motion to
transfer venue pursuant to the federal venue statute, 93 federal law
applies to determine the construction and validity of the forum-
selection clause.94 The context in which arbitration agreements will
86. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 4.
87. See id. at 12-13.
88. See 499 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1991).
89. See id. at 588, 594-95.
90. See id.
91. Note that current law, which basically requires the application of general contract
defenses to invalidate forum-selection clauses, closely parallels the Supreme Court's treatment
of arbitration clauses under the FAA. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FAA.
92. This extension of the law demonstrates that the law of forum-selection clauses is not
restricted to admiralty cases such as The Bremen and Carnival Cruise Lines.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1994). This section of the statute provides that "[flor the conven-
ience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Id. § 1404(b).
The statute allows any party to an action to file a motion for transfer of venue. See id.
Typically, a party seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause will file a transfer of venue
motion, and offer the forum-selection clause as evidence in support of the motion. See, e.g., The
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 4-5 (demonstrating the use of this strategy).
94. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988). The application of
federal forum-selection law to a transfer of venue case does not necessarily mean that unless
there is something akin to unconscionability in the forum-selection agreement, the motion will
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be raised is in a motion to dismiss, because the arbitration clause
selects a forum outside the court system. The Supreme Court has yet
to rule on whether federal or state law applies when a forum-selection
clause is offered as evidence in support of a motion to dismiss. The
circuit courts are divided on the issue.95
B. State Laws Invalidating Forum-Selection Clauses in
Franchise Agreements
Although federal law has consistently held that forum-
selection clauses are presumptively valid, many states restrict the
validity of forum-selection clauses in particular circumstances.
Currently, thirteen states have judicial rules, statutes, or
administrative rules which either hold forum-selection clauses in
franchise agreements invalid or subject them to a high degreee of
scrutiny when the clauses specify a forum outside of a franchisee's
home state.9 6 Many of these laws have been enacted recently and
reflect a trend towards increased scrutiny of these types of clauses,
particularly in franchise agreements.9 7
1. Judicial Rules
Several state courts have recently adopted rules that hold
certain forum-selection clauses presumptively invalid or subject to a
standard of review higher than the standard under federal law. The
New Jersey Supreme Court pronounced the strongest anti-forum
selection law in Kubis & Perszyk Associates v. Sun Microsystems.98
Although less stringent than the New Jersey Supreme Court's
be granted. In a transfer of venue motion, the district court must consider a variety of factors
which may include the state law's treatment of forum-selection clauses.
95. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988)
(discussing the split in the circuits over whether state or federal forum-selection law applies,
and deciding that federal law applies). The difference between a motion to transfer and a
motion to dismiss is that in a motion to transfer, a federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1404) is directly
on point, whereas no statute directly applies to a motion to dismiss. See id. at 512. See
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26-32, for a complete discussion of the Erie analysis that led the Court to
its conclusion that federal law applied in the context of a section 1404 transfer motion. See
generally Robert A. de By, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie
Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1068, 1079-83 (1989) (discussing the circuit split and arguing that
state law should apply in federal court for purposes of a motion to dismiss). In state courts,
state law of forum-selection clauses applies.
96. The states are California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington.
97. See Brenner, supra note 6, at 108-13; Levin & Morrison, supra note 5, at 92.
98. 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996).
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decision, other courts' scrutiny of forum-selection clauses also
arguably conflicts with the federal rule of presumptive validity.99
In Kubis the plaintiff, a franchisee of a retail computer
company, brought suit claiming violations of the New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act'00 and tortious interference with business
relationships after the defendant had terminated the parties'
agreement.10' The agreement in question included a forum-selection
clause which stated that a California court was the exclusive forum
for adjudicating disputes over the agreement. 0 2 The defendant moved
to dismiss the case pursuant to the forum-selection clause, and the
New Jersey trial court granted the motion. 03
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding the forum-
selection clause unenforceable and announcing a rule that forum-
selection clauses in agreements subject to the Franchise Practices Act
are presumptively invalid.'04 The court reasoned that enforcement of
forum-selection clauses would frustrate the protections that the
legislature intended to provide to franchisees: the protection from the
problems of "unequal bargaining power and the unavailability of
prompt judicial relief."05 Thus, in order to move a New Jersey court
to uphold a forum-selection clause in a franchise contract, a fran-
chisor must show that the clause was a product of a real bargain and
not merely a boilerplate clause in a contract of adhesion.
Several states have case law upholding forum-selection clauses
only if the clauses are demonstrated to be reasonable and not the
product of unfair bargaining power. 06 Many of these states apply
99. Compare Kubis, 680 A.2d at 626 (holding forum-selection clauses in franchise agree-
ments presumptively invalid), with Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D.
Wis. 1981) (requiring free bargaining but not applying a presumption of invalidity).
100. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to 56:10-15 (West 1989).
101. See Kubis, 680 A.2d at 619-20.
102. See id. at 618.
103. See id. at 620.
104. See id. at 626.
105. Id. at 622. The court took special note of the fact that the Franchise Practices Act had
a provision which invalidated forum-selection clauses in automobile dealership franchise agree-
ments. See id. at 623. This provided further support for the policy the court found apparent in
the Act. The dissent disagreed, arguing that the legislature's adoption of the law for automobile
franchises but not for all franchises signaled its rejection of the idea. See id. at 631 (Garibaldi,
J., dissenting). At the end of the opinion, the court emphasized that the rule it had fashioned
was not the result of a worry over the ability of another court system to adequately protect
franchisees. See id. at 628. Rather, the rule was a recognition of the fact that even if the same
relief could be afforded in another jurisdiction, the accessibility of a far-away jurisdiction to a
typical franchisee may be practically nonexistent. See id.
106. See Davis v. Great Am. Cleaners, Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 10,979 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. July 23, 1996) (invalidating forum-selection clause in franchise agreement because of
imbalance of bargaining power and serious inconvenience to franchisee); see also Cutter v. Scott
& Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 908-09 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (refusing to enforce forum-selection
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rules that arguably are stricter than both the federal law of forum-
selection and the general state law of unconscionability. 107  The
question remains whether one of these laws, if applied to invalidate
an arbitration clause, would be in conflict with the FAA. Arguably, in
this case the arbitration clause is held to a stricter standard than
other contracts generally. 08
All of these decisions invalidate forum-selection clauses that
would have forced resolution in another judicial forum. None of the
cases deals with or discusses arbitration agreements. Thus it is not
clear whether the rules from these cases would be applied to
arbitration agreements that select a remote forum. With the FAA
and its apparent national policy in favor of arbitration, different
considerations arise when arbitration agreements are at stake.0 9
However, the policies underlying the invalidation of judicial forum-
selection clauses, such as guarding against abuse of unequal
bargaining power and protecting the franchisee's ability to easily seek
redress, apply equally to arbitration agreements that select a remote
forum. As the Kubis court stated, whether the franchisee would be
able to seek redress in the venue at all without great expense and
inconvenience was the concern addressed."0 The court was not
interested in whether the alternative venue would adequately protect
clause because clause was not freely bargained for, inconvenience of forum was evenly balanced,
and Wisconsin dealership laws created a public policy in favor of adjudication in Wisconsin);
Homer v. Tilton, 650 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding forum-selection clause but
requiring that it be reasonable, just, and freely negotiated); see also Brenner, supra note 6, at
108-12 (discussing these and other similar cases).
107. Compare Cutter, 510 F. Supp. at 908-09 (invalidating forum-selection clause because of
inequality of bargaining power, even though each party was equally inconvenienced by the
location), with Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (upholding forum-
selection clause in adhesion contract that required a Washington resident to bring suit in
Florida, the other party's home state).
108. Although this Note focuses on state laws that apply to forum-selection clauses in fran-
chise agreements, the situation above would raise many of the same issues regarding FAA
preemption.
At least four states adhere to the old common law rule of strict invalidity of all forum-
selection. See Keelean v. Central Bank of the South, 544 So. 2d 153, 156 (Ala. 1989); Cartridge
Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, 209 S.E.2d 132, 132 (Ga. App. 1974); State ex rel.
Polaris Indus. v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471, 471-72 (Mont. 1985); Dowling v. NADW Mktg.,
578 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982).
These rules are premised on a policy against "ousting" the state court of jurisdiction, rather
than protection of bargaining power. See de By, supra note 95, at 1071.
109. The Supreme Court first found this "national policy" in favor of arbitration implicit in
the FAA in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Thus, the Court
concluded, to further this policy, all doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration. See id.
Because no comparable national policy in favor of forum-selection clauses exists at the state
level, states may want to treat arbitration clauses more favorably than similar forum-selection
clauses.
110. See supra note 105.
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the franchisee's rights. Thus these judicial rules are likely to apply to
arbitration clauses as well."'
2. Statutes
Many states have enacted statutes which invalidate forum-
selection clauses in franchise agreements that select an out-of-state
forum."2 The wording of these statutes, however, differs from state to
state. For example, some statutes invalidate forum-selection clauses
in general. Others specifically invalidate arbitration clauses or
exclude arbitration clauses from the reach of the statute.
a. Statutes With No Express Reference to Arbitration Clauses
California, Rhode Island, and South Dakota have statutes
which void forum-selection clauses in franchise agreements that se-
lect an out-of-state forum."3 None of these statutes distinguishes
litigation from arbitration. Each statute uses the phrase "restricting
jurisdiction or venue to a forum" in describing the proscribed forum-
selection clauses."4 Because any judicial or administrative law on
these statutes is unreported, it remains unclear whether the statutes
apply to arbitration agreements as well as litigation-oriented clauses.
Arguably, the use of the words "jurisdiction" and "venue" suggest
application only to litigation. However, the use of the general word
"forum" instead of "court" or another term specific to litigation
suggests application to arbitration clauses. 115
In addition, the general policy behind state franchise laws
supports the application of these laws to arbitration agreements.
State franchise laws are designed to protect franchisees from unfair
treatment as a result of their lesser bargaining power.1 6 A legislative
intent to protect franchisees from the unfairness in having to travel to
111. See Franchise Agreement Arbitration Clauses Are Here to Stay... Or Are They?, supra
note 7, at 173 (noting that arbitration clauses are "ripe for challenge in New Jersey" after
Kubis).
112. See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
113. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20.40.5 (West 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-14
(1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-5A-51.1 (Michie 1994).
114. See id.
115. An arbitration agreement is widely recognized as a "specialized forum-selection
clause." See supra note 4.
116. See, e.g., Kubis & Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d at 618, 627-28
(N.J. 1996) (noting that the purpose of the New Jersey Franchise Act is to protect against
exploitation of franchisees because of their inferior bargaining power); Homer v. Tilton, 650
N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (reaching a similar conclusion about the purpose of the
Indiana franchise laws).
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a remote forum for dispute resolution underlies these particular
forum-selection statutes.117 This rationale should apply regardless of
the type of forum in which the dispute will be heard." 8
b. Statutes Explicitly Applicable to Arbitration Clauses
North Carolina and Michigan have statutes that explicitly
include arbitration clauses in the franchise statute invalidating fo-
rum-selection clauses." 9  Under Michigan's Franchise Investment
Law, a provision in a franchise agreement requiring out-of-state liti-
gation or arbitration is void and unenforceable.12 North Carolina's
statute applies not only to franchise agreements but to most contracts
entered into in North Carolina that require litigation or arbitration of
any dispute over the contract in an out-of-state forum.' 2 1 Any
agreements that fall within the broad scope of this provision are void
and unenforceable. 122
The purpose of each of these statutes is not spelled out in
legislative history but can be inferred from the policy behind related
statutes. In Michigan, the forum-selection statute is part of the
Michigan Franchise Investment Law, which was enacted to protect
franchisees from unfair surprise or hardship resulting from their
117. Unfortunately no legislative history is available for the individual forum-selection
statutes. However, given that the general rationale behind state franchise laws is to protect
franchisees with inferior bargaining power from hardship, these statutes are likely directed
specifically at protecting franchisees from being forced to travel to remote places to resolve dis-
putes. State courts have inferred this rationale from general franchise statutes. See Kubis, 680
A.2d at 628; Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Wis. 1981); see also Joseph
E. Smith, Note, Civil Procedure-Forum Selection-N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 (1994), 72 N.C. L.
REv. 1608, 1611 (1994) (noting that the North Carolina anti-forum-selection statute was passed
to protect those "with little bargaining power").
118. Alternatively, these statutes may be intended to address concerns about subjecting a
franchisee to a foreign state's judicial "police power." Under this rationale, these statutes would
not invalidate an arbitration clause because an out-of-state arbitration does not subject the
franchisee to another state's legal power. The general policy behind these franchise statutes (to
protect against abuse of franchisees) does not suggest this "police power" distinction. The
hardship of a franchisee who travels to a remote location is unaffected by whether a arbitrator
or court will resolve the dispute.
119. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1527(f) (West 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3
(1997).
120. See MCH. Com. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(f) (West 1989). The statute makes an excep-
tion for arbitration agreements entered into after the dispute has arisen. See id.
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (Michie 1997).
122. See id. The statute also makes an exception for arbitration agreements entered into
after the dispute has arisen. See id. Puerto Rico also has a statute which invalidates forum-
selection and arbitration clauses that call for out-of-state forums in dealer agreements. P.R.
LAWS ANN., tit.10, § 278b-2 (1997). A dealer agreement is defined to include what is commonly
thought of as a franchise agreement. This statute has been held to be preempted by the FAA as
applied to arbitration agreements. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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relative lack of business savvy and legal knowledge and their inferior
resources.' In North Carolina, the forum-selection statute is not
part of a set of franchise laws. Instead, the statute applies to a broad
range of agreements. 12 The legislature passed the statute to overrule
a North Carolina Supreme Court decision and protect those with
inferior bargaining power.125
c. Statutes Excluding Arbitration from Their Purview
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota have franchise statutes
that invalidate out-of-state forum-selection clauses, but all appear to
except arbitration agreements. Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota's
statutes exclude arbitration agreements explicitly.126 The scope of
Iowa's statute is questionable. One section voids provisions
restricting "jurisdiction to a forum outside [the] state," without
explicitly mentioning arbitration. 127 In contrast, a later section of the
statute provides that "[p]arties to a franchise may agree to
independent arbitration, mediation, or other nonjudicial resolution of
an existing or future dispute."12 Thus it is unclear whether this
section excludes arbitration agreements from the provision restricting
forum selection or merely expressly allows parties to make these
agreements subject to the restrictions of the forum-selection
provision. Unfortunately, no reported case or administrative rule
appears on this issue in Iowa, nor does any legislative history
regarding the purpose of the statute.
The reason these states protect arbitration agreements from
the reach of the forum-selection statute remains unclear. Perhaps the
legislature was concerned that the FAA will preempt the law if the
statute is applied to arbitration agreements. 29 Another possibility is
that the forum-selection laws are concerned with subjecting a state
resident to the "police power" of another state. °30 Regardless of the
123. See Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 F.3d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining the policy
behind the law). For a detailed discussion of the Michigan Franchise Investment Law, see
generally Richard H. May and David L. Steinberg, Great Expectations: 1984 Amendments to
Franchise Investment Law, 64 MICH. BUS. L.J. 32 (1985).
124. The statute applies to all agreements entered into in North Carolina, with some excep-
tions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (Michie 1997).
125. See Smith, supra note 117, at 1613 (discussing the law's enactment).
126. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/4 (West 1997); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1 (1997); MINN.
STAT. § 2860.4400(J) (1997).
127. IOwA CODE ANN. § 523H.3(1) (West Supp. 1997). This section is quite similar to the
statutes mentioned in note 113, which do not distinguish between arbitration and litigation.
128. See id. § 523H.3(3).
129. See Levin & Morrison, supra note 5, at 117 (suggesting this reason).
130. See supra note 118 for a discussion of this rationale.
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rationale, franchisors in these states are free to include arbitration
clauses requiring out-of-state resolution of their disputes.
3. Administrative Rules
In Maryland, North Dakota, and Washington, state adminis-
trators have construed broad franchise statutes that impose general
obligations on franchisors, and ruled that under these laws, clauses
which provide for litigation or arbitration outside the state are inva-
lid. Maryland has no statute or judicial rule invalidating these
clauses. However, under the Maryland Franchise Registration and
Disclosure Law, state administrators require a franchise agreement
to provide that the franchisee may sue in Maryland for alleged viola-
tions of the Maryland Franchise Registration and Disclosure Law.131
No distinction between litigation and arbitration exists. 132
North Dakota's franchise statute empowers the state
Securities Commissioner to deny franchise registration if, in the
Commissioner's opinion, the franchise agreement is "unfair, unjust, or
inequitable to the franchisees." 3 The Commissioner has concluded
that forum-selection clauses selecting out-of-state courts, and arbitra-
tion clauses providing for remote arbitration sites, are unfair, unjust,
or inequitable and, therefore, in violation of the statute."4 Similarly,
in Washington, the Securities Administrator is given the power to
interpret and enforce the state Franchise Investment Protection Act,
and the Administrator has determined that a franchisor requiring an
out-of-state arbitration clause violates the Act."35
IV. ANALYSIS: STATE FORUM-SELECTION LAWS VS. THE FAA
Few reported cases discuss the conflict between the FAA and
state laws limiting forum-selection clauses."36 However, with the
trend towards increased use of arbitration agreements in franchise
agreements, and the increasing number of states instituting laws that
protect franchisees against forum-selection clauses that are perceived
as unfair, this issue will likely be an important one in the future. In
131. See Levin & Morrison, supra note 5, at 117 (providing an explanation of this law).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 118.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1996).
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addition to resolution of the immediate question, this issue also has
important implications for the scope of FAA preemption and the
viability of state laws that restrict the use of arbitration agreements
for reasons other than concerns about arbitration.
State franchise laws that invalidate forum-selection clauses
selecting an out-of-state forum should not be preempted by the FAA.
Three reasons support this result. First, these laws are outside the
FAA's preemptive scope because they do not "single out" arbitration
agreements and hold them to a higher standard. Second, these laws
do not undermine the FAA's goals and policies. The laws are
concerned with the unequal bargaining power and the unfairness of a
remote forum, rather than general concern about arbitration
agreements. Third, using the FAA to preempt these state laws and
uphold arbitration agreements that would otherwise be struck down
would, conflict with the FAA's fundamental purpose of placing
arbitration agreements on the same footing as all other contracts.
A. State Forum-Selection Laws Do Not Single Out Arbitration
Agreements for Increased Scrutiny
Consistently, the Supreme Court has held that state laws may
not "single out" arbitration agreements and subject them to greater
scrutiny than other agreements. 3 7 The Court, however, has also
noted consistently that, as the text of the FAA provides, arbitration
agreements can be invalidated "upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."18 The Court has inter-
preted this phrase to allow general contract law to invalidate
arbitration agreements, and many lower courts have responded. 13 9 In
particular, lower courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability
to void arbitration agreements that are not the result of open bar-
gaining, subjecting the party of lesser bargaining power to a biased
arbitrator or to an arbitration at a highly inconvenient site.140
137. See Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1656.
138. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).
139. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 169 (Cal. 1981) (stating clause
was unconscionable due to biased arbitrator); Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 563, 566-67 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding unconscionability due to foreign forum); see also
supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing these and other related cases).
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State laws limiting forum-selection in franchise agreements
are a form of general contract law.'4 ' Instead of distinguishing
arbitration agreements, these laws apply to all forum-selection
clauses. This difference immediately distinguishes Casarotto and all
other Supreme Court precedent on FAA preemption. The Supreme
Court has never held that a state law which applies to more than just
arbitration agreements is preempted. One can view these laws as a
legislative ruling that any time a franchisor inserts a forum-selection
clause into a franchise agreement providing for a forum out of the
franchisee's state, the imbalance of bargaining power and hardship on
the franchisee gives rise to unconscionability.
Of course, these state laws do not apply to all contracts. These
laws apply only to forum-selection clauses in franchise agreements.
Proponents of FAA preemption will argue that these state laws are
not part of general contract law but are instead laws that invalidate
only forum-selection and arbitration clauses. Thus, the argument
goes, these laws hold forum-selection and arbitration agreements to a
higher standard than contracts generally, violating the principle of
Casarotto42 and other cases.
This argument overlooks the important difference between the
state laws struck down by the Supreme Court and the state laws
discussed here. In Casarotto, for example, the Montana notice provi-
sion applied only to arbitration agreements. 43 Because it did not
apply to other agreements, a logical inference is that the Montana
legislature was particulary concerned about the potential effect of
arbitration agreements. This type of rationale is what the FAA was
designed to prevent and what the Supreme Court meant when it held
that the FAA preempts statutes that hold arbitration to "suspect
status."144 The state laws invalidated in the other Supreme Court
cases construing the FAA similarly scrutinized the arbitration agree-
ments because of concerns over arbitration, rather than concerns over
bargaining power or some other general contract concern.145
141. See Traci L. Jones, Note, State Law of Contract Formation in the Shadow of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 46 Duke L.J. 651, 676-77 (1996) (arguing that a forum-selection clause
is part of contract law); Ware, supra note 57, at 1028.
142. 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 688.
145. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 5 (1984). The state law in Southland
was a judicial decision requiring judicial consideration of claims brought under state franchise
laws. This ruling seems to have as an underlying rationale a worry that arbitration will not
adequately protect the rights of the franchisee. This type of suspicion over arbitration agree-
ments is what the courts have interpreted the FAA to preempt. See id. at 16.
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B. State Forum-Selection Laws Address a Concern Entirely Distinct
from Arbitration
The state laws in question do not "single out" arbitration
agreements. Instead, they are concerned with contractual issues very
different from those that the FAA was designed to override. The
FAA's purpose was to undo the courts' centuries-old aversion to arbi-
tration agreements that arose because they provided for alternative
dispute resolution.146 In contrast, as discussed above, the purpose
behind the state laws restricting forum-selection clauses is to prevent
the abuse of franchisees by powerful franchisors who are more
sophisticated and have far more resources available. 147  This
protection of the franchisee is a legitimate application of state
contract law and is distinct from the FAA's rationale.
As the Supreme Court has stated many times, the central pur-
pose behind the FAA was to override judicial hesitation to enforce
arbitration agreements. 48 Before the enactment of the FAA, courts
regularly invalidated arbitration agreements, often without any ac-
tual scrutiny of the fairness of the agreement. 49 The typical rationale
was that arbitration agreements were void or voidable at the wil of
either party because, if enforced, they would "oust the jurisdiction of
the court."15O The FAA supplanted this judicially-made law by re-
quiring arbitration agreements to be held to the same standard as all
contracts. Today, in light of the text of the FAA and the Supreme
Court's construction of it, no one legitimately can argue that arbitra-
tion agreements can be voided merely because they "oust the jurisdic-
tion of the court."
Standing in stark contrast to this "ousting" rationale is the
rationale behind today's state statutes and rules that invalidate fo-
rum-selection clauses. As noted above, the general. policy behind state
franchise laws is to protect franchisees from abuse because of their
inferior bargaining power.' 5' The specific statutes, rules, and deci-
sions that restrict the use of forum-selection and arbitration clauses
146. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)
(discussing this purpose behind the FAA).
147. See Kubis v. & Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 621-26 (N.J.
1996) (discussing adhesion contracts and forum selection clauses); see also supra notes 117-18
and accompanying text (discussing the policy behind these state laws).
148. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
149. See Diamond, supra note 20, at 35-37 (discussing the history of these arguments).
150. See id. at 36 n.2.
151. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy behind
state franchise laws.
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follow this general policy by protecting franchisees from the burden of
traveling to a distant forum to resolve their disputes. 152 These laws
reflect no concern over courts' jurisdiction being "ousted." A state-
ment from the Kubis court is particularly instructive:
Parochialism plays no role in our decision. We have no doubt that courts in
other states, both state and federal, would faithfully and fairly apply the [New
Jersey] Franchise Act to suits within their jurisdiction .... We recognize,
however, that even if a California and a New Jersey court afforded identical
relief under the Act to an aggrieved franchisee, there may be a difference of
substantial magnitude in the practical accessibility of that relief from the
perspective of an unsophisticated and underfinanced New Jersey franchisee. 153
As the language from Kubis demonstrates, these laws are based on
neither any increased suspicion or dislike of arbitration clauses, nor
any concern that the court's jurisdiction will be "ousted." Rather,
these laws are designed to prevent franchisors from effectively taking
away a franchisee's right to seek redress for a breach of the franchise
contract. A law which protects the rights of parties with inferior
bargaining power can be considered general contract law. At the
least, this type of law is clearly unrelated to the policy that the FAA
was designed to preempt.M
C. FAA Preemption of State Forum-Selection Laws Would Undermine
the Overriding Policy of the FAA
Ironically, the FAA's policy of placing arbitration agreements
on the same level as other agreements would be undermined if the
FAA preempted state forum-selection laws. A comparison of two
franchise agreements illustrates this irony: (1) One franchise
agreement contains an arbitration clause requiring any dispute to be
resolved before an arbitrator in the franchisor's home state, far from
the franchisee's home; (2) the other franchise agreement has a judicial
forum-selection clause requiring that any suit be filed in court in the
franchisor's home state, also far from the franchisee's home. Assume
the franchisee operates in a state that has adopted a law invalidating
forum-selection clauses selecting out-of-state sites for resolution.
152. While many of these state laws do not have legislative history or other explicit evi-
dence of the policy behind them, this purpose seems fitting in light of the general policy behind
franchise laws. See infra Part I.B for discussion of these state laws and the policy behind
them.
153. Kubis & Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 628 (N.J. 1996).
154. See supra note 20.
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Assuming further the application of state forum-selection law,155 the
forum-selection clause designating the out-of-state court would be
invalidated. In contrast, if the FAA preempts the state law as applied
to the arbitration agreement, a court would uphold the arbitration
agreement. Thus, the arbitration agreement would not be on the
same level as the other agreement. Instead, the forum-selection
agreement would be invalidated and the arbitration agreement would
be upheld, even though both agreements present the same "remote
forum" problem the state law is designed to remedy 56 and both are
equally invalid under state law.157
This result is fundamentally at odds with the FAA's purpose.
By enacting the FAA, Congress intended to eliminate judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements and require equal enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements and other contract provisions. 58 As the example
above demonstrates, this ironic result places arbitration agreements
on a higher level than other contracts. As the Supreme Court stated
in Prima Paint, the FAA is supposed "to make arbitration agreements
as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."159 If the FAA is
held to preempt these state laws as applied to arbitration agreements,
arbitration agreements will be favored over forum-selection clauses.
Congress intended no such result. 60
155. In federal court, federal law may apply to the enforcement of a forum-selection provi-
sion. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
156. Again, one may argue that the state law was designed merely to protect an in-state
franchisee from another state's "police power." Given the judicial reasoning and legislative
intent behind these state laws, however, this explanation is hardly plausible. See supra note
118 and accompanying text for a discussion of this possibility.
157. Puerto Rico's law has this exact inconsistency. In Mistubishi Motors, the First Circuit
held that the FAA overruled a local statute invalidating forum-selection and arbitration clauses
calling for out-of-state forums. Mistubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723
F.2d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1983). See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the case and others following it. Recently a federal district court in Puerto Rico invalidated a
forum-selection clause in a dealership agreement calling for an out-of-state judicial forum
because of the local statute. See Triangle Trading Co., Inc. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 952 F. Supp.
75, 80 (D. P.R. 1997). Thus, under Puerto Rican, and possibly First Circuit, law arbitration
agreements apparently are held in higher regard than other forum-selection clauses.
158. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996).
159. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967); see also Volt
Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (quoting the passage from
Prima Paint with approval).
160. When the decision is made to invalidate an arbitration agreement pursuant to a law of
this type, an interesting question arises: Should the arbitration agreement be entirely voided, to
allow for judicial consideration of the dispute between the parties, or should the court merely
require that the arbitration agreement take place inside the franchisee's home state (thus
complying with the state franchise law)? While this issue is outside the scope of this Note, a
preliminary analysis suggests that in most cases the best alternative will be to invalidate the
entire clause.
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V. CONCLUSION
This issue will be hotly contested in the near future.
Arbitration clauses in franchise agreements are already common and
are appearing with increasing frequency. At the same time, state
laws restricting the application of these clauses are becoming more
prevalent. Franchisors value arbitration clauses providing for a
remote forum and are not likely to relinquish them in the face of a
state law. Instead they will rely on the powerful Federal Arbitration
Act to uphold the agreement. As this Note argues, however, these
state laws can invalidate arbitration agreements without running
afoul of the FAA.
Irrespective of the wisdom of state forum-selection laws, if
enacted, these laws should be permitted to invalidate arbitration
agreements because the laws are not preempted by the FAA.
Arguably, these statutes, rules, and judicial decisions are overly pa-
ternalistic and will have the effect of invalidating provisions even in
situations where franchisees understand the effect of the forum-
In its best scenario, merely restricting arbitration to inside the franchisee's home state may
uphold the intent of both the FAA and the state franchise law by first allowing arbitration to
take place, and, second, protecting the franchisee against the burden of a remote forum. This
alternative is not required by the FAA, however. At first glance, striking down an entire
arbitration agreement pursuant to a state forum-selection law may seem to hold arbitration
agreements to stricter scrutiny than judicial forum-selection agreements, because the state law
invalidates both the place and type of resolution selected in the arbitration agreement, while
only invalidating the place of resolution in the forum-selection agreement. On close inspection,
however, these two clauses are not treated differently. The judicial forum-selection clause
retains its type of resolution, that is, the ability to bring suit in court, only because the judicial
consideration is always available. Thus the arbitration agreement is held to the same standard
as other contracts, even if the entire arbitration clause is invalidated.
Requiring arbitration inside the franchisee's home state would also raise potentially serious
practical and legal problems. In many cases, the arbitrator that the parties selected will be
unavailable to arbitrate the case in a different state. Having the parties select another arbitra-
tor may be practically impossible because the franchisee has already filed suit to avoid arbitra-
tion under the contract. The court could select an arbitrator, but this would create a great risk
that the court would be enforcing a contract to which the parties never agreed.
Even if an arbitrator does not need to be selected, a court may not compel arbitration in a
different forum than that selected by the agreement if the forum-selection aspect of the arbitra-
tion agreement is not severable from the agreement to arbitrate itself. For an arbitration
agreement to be found severable, the forum-selection aspect of the agreement must be only a
"minor consideration," while the agreement to arbitrate is the "essential term." National
Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS sec. 184-85). In typical franchise agreements with
arbitration clauses providing for arbitration in the home state of the franchisor, the site of the
arbitration is likely to be an important aspect of the arbitration agreement to the franchisor.
Some franchisors may even prefer to have the entire arbitration clause voided, rather than
pursue arbitration in an undesirable location and before an arbitrator the franchisor did not
choose.
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selection provision and the provision is the result of free bargaining.161
The question addressed here, however, is not whether these laws are
good policy, but whether they violate the FAA.
The proper resolution of this conflict is to allow the state law to
invalidate the arbitration agreement. The FAA was never intended to
preempt this type of state law, one that does not single out arbitration
agreements, and is, instead, concerned with a distinct legitimate state
interest. Indeed, allowing the FAA to preempt these state laws would
produce perverse results, invalidating judicial forum-selection
agreements while upholding arbitration agreements. Thus, allowing
these state laws to invalidate arbitration agreements would follow
Supreme Court precedent and comport with the congressional intent
and the purpose of the FAA.
James Zimmerman *
161. See Levin & Morrison, supra note 5, at 118 (criticizing the Kubis rule because it makes
"several assumptions concerning franchisors and franchisees which seem entirely out of date
with current commercial realities"); see also Smith, supra note 117, at 1614-17 (criticizing the
North Carolina statute because it is overbroad and unnecessary).
* The Author would like to thank Amanda Vaughn, Brian Duffy, Shannon Pinkston,
Owen Donley, Stephen Johnson, and Professor Tom McCoy for their assistance in the
development and editing of this Note.
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